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REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE
ABUSES: LEGAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL BARRIERS
DAVID KAIRYS* AND JULIE SHAPIRO**
The private constabulary system, by which armed forces are em-
ployed during labor troubles has worked untold damage in Amer-
ica. It is a condition akin to the feudal system of warfare, when
private interests can employ troops of mercenaries to wage war at
their command .... In no other country in the world, with the
exception of China is it possible for the individual to surround
himself with a standing army to do his bidding in defiance of law
and order .... The conditions I have outlined could never obtain
in England. During labor troubles the government looks after the
policing and under no circumstances permits the meddling of pri-
vate detectives.
-Thomas Beet, of Scotland Yard (1906)1
While, as Beet observed, surveillance and intelligence activities by pri-
vate companies and individuals are not new to the United States, 2 the
nuclear power industry's resort to such activities poses new civil liberties and
social problems. 3 The extreme danger embodied in nuclear facilities and
materials and the fear of "nuclear terrorism" provide the most plausible
justification in our history for the wholesale destruction of civil liberties.
*B.S. Cornell University (1965); LL.B. Columbia University (1968); LL.M. University
of Pennsylvania (1971). Member of the Philadelphia law firm of Kairys, Rudovsky &
Maguigan and Philadelphia counsel for the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.
This article draws upon and uses language from Kairys, Civil Liberties and the Fight Over
Nuclear Power, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 19.
**Third year law student at the University of Pennsylvania.
1. L. WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 216 (1927), quoting
Beet, Methods of American Private Detective Agencies, 8 APPLETON'S MAGAZINE 444 (1906).
2. See F. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 414-45 (1980); R. GOLDSTEIN, POuTICAL
REPRESSION IN MODERN AmERICA, FRoM 1870 TO PRESENT (1978); J. HOUGAN, Spoo.Ks, THE
HAUNTING OF AmERICA, THE PRIVATE USE OF SECRET AGENTS (1978); Wallace, School for
Spies, INQUIRY MAO., July 9-23, 1979, at 11.
3. See R. JUNGK, THE NEW TYRANNY: How NUCLEAR POWER ENSLAVES Us (1979);
Butz, Surveillance of the Anti-Nuke Movement, THE PUBLIC EYE, Apr. 1978, at 40 (pub-
lished by the Repression Information Project, Washington, D.C.); Comey, Nuclear Power
and Civil Liberties, CBE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, Oct. 1978 at 6; Marwick, Nuclear Power
Critics and the Intelligence Community, FIRST PRINCIPLES, Apr. 1979, at 1 (published by the
Center for National Security Studies); Pollock, The Shifty Eye of Reddy Kilowatt, MOTHER
JoNEs, May 1978, at 13; WARNOCK, NUCLEAR POWER AND CIV.L LIBERTIES, CAN WE HAVE
BoTH? (1979) (published by the Citizens' Energy Project, Washington, D.C.). For a compre-
hensive treatment of this problem, see J. PETERZELL, NUCLEAR POWER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1981) (published by the Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C.).
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Ostensibly responding to these dangers, corporate and government
agencies have conducted surveillance of and gathered intelligence about
opponents of nuclear power.4 As in the past, 5 the targets of these activities
are not terrorists but citizens who nonviolently oppose corporate and gov-
ernment policy: the intent and effect has been not to provide security, but to
subvert groups and individuals who seek to change those policies.6 The
emerging question is not merely whether we can tolerate some infringements
on civil liberties in the face of a potentially great danger, but whether
nuclear power and democracy can coexist.
The nature and scope of the nuclear industry's surveillance and intelli-
gence activities have been set out and documented elsewhere. 7 This paper
discusses possible legal remedies available to victims of such activities, and
after concluding that existing remedies are inadequate, attempts to place the
issue in a broader social context.
I
LEGAL REMEDIES
The following discussion briefly considers possible federal, state and
administrative remedies. The variety of surveillance and intelligence activi-
ties are considered together (and referred to generally as intelligence activi-
ties) except where there is a significant difference in the availability of a
remedy.
A. Federal Remedies
The federal Civil Rights Acts8 for the most part apply only to govern-
mental action,9 and the Supreme Court has recently ruled that the activity of
a privately owned utility is not "state action" even where the utility is
regulated and has been granted a monopoly by the state. 10 In Jackson v.
4. Butz, supra note 3, at 43-45; Marwick, supra note 3, at 5-6; Pollock, supra note 3 at
13-14; PETERZELL, supra note 3; WARNOCK, supra note 3, at 55-104.
5. See generally, DONNER, supra note 2; SENATE SELECT COMMITEE TO STUDY GOVERN-
MENTAL OPERATIONS, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, (the Church Committee Report); N. BLACKSTOCK, COIN-
TELPRO, Ti FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL FREEDOM (1975); Ryter, Cointelpro: Corrupt-
ing American Institutions, FIRST PRINCIPLES, May 1978, at 1; Donner, The Terrorist as
Scapegoat, THE NATION, May 20, 1978, at 590.
6. Marwick, supra note 3, at 5-6; Pollock, supra note 3 at 13-14; Butz, supra note 3, at
43-45; PETERZELL, supra note 3, at 3-4; WARNOCK, supra note 3, at 55-104.
7. See authorities cited supra notes 3-4. This paper also does not discuss the civil
liberties issues particular to employees in the nuclear industry.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-95, 2000(a)-(h) (1976).
9. This statement pertains specifically to section 1983, which provides for a civil action
for deprivation of civil rights under color of law. Section 1985 probably does not require
state action, see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), but the plaintiff must prove the
existence of a conspiracy in order to prevail. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). See infra text
accompanying notes 27-32.
10. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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Metropolitan Edison Co.,II involving the operator of Three Mile Island, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the utility had
terminated electric service to a home without notice, a hearing, or an
opportunity for the resident to pay overdue bills. 12 The customer argued
that this act constituted state action, giving several reasons: the state had
conferred monopoly status on Metropolitan, Metropolitan provided "an
essential public service required to be supplied on a reasonably continuous
basis... and hence performed a 'public function,' "3 the state had autho-
rized and approved the termination practice, and the state taxed and regu-
lated Metropolitan and thus had a "close symbiotic relationship" with the
utility.1 4 The Court found these contentions, considered both individually
and together, unpersuasive. 5 It reasoned that, at most, "Metropolitan was
a heavily regulated, privately owned utility, enjoying at least a partial
monopoly .. and that it elected to terminate service to petitioner in a
manner which the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission found permissi-
ble under state law." 16 This connection, it concluded, was insufficient to
attribute Metropolitan's conduct to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 17
Although the Court's standards for determining state action-a "suffi-
ciently close nexus" and a "symbiotic relationship" '8-are so vague, tauto-
logical and devoid of content as to defy reasoned application, there are two
major arguments available for distinguishing Metropolitan Edison in the
nuclear surveillance context. First, one could argue that different constitu-
tional rights or different public functions carried out by private entities call
for differing standards for finding state action. Specifically, utilities could
be held to exercise state power when they act contrary to principles of free
speech or equality (as opposed to due process rights) or when the function
challenged closely parallels the state's police function (as opposed to some
other state function). However, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his
dissent, 19 the Court has thus far rejected the notion of differing state action
standards.20
Second, one could argue that where the utility action concerns nuclear
power, it may amount to federal action.2 1 This argument would stress that
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 352.
14. Id. at 351-58.
15. Id. at 351.
16. Id. at 358.
17. Id. at 358-59.
18. Id. at 351, 357.
19. Id. at 365. Justices Douglas and Brennan also dissented in separate opinions. Id. at
359, 364.
20. Id. at 373-74.
21. This argument has been raised and briefed by an anti-nuclear group in Long Island
Lighting Co. v. SHAD, No. 80-17790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., motion for dismissal for counterclaims
granted Sept. 10, 1981) (discussed infra at notes 79-84 and accompanying text.)
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nuclear power is subject to government control far beyond that exercised
over utilities generally,2 2 although it does not appear that the government
has specifically required or suggested that the utilities engage in intelligence
activities against opponents of nuclear power.
These and other arguments should be pressed, but the substance and
tone of the Metropolitan Edison decision are quite clear, and the case
should be seen not as an aberration but as part of the Court's recent trend
toward restricting federal court jurisdiction to remedy constitutional viola-
tions.2 3 It is unlikely that any court will find that a private utility's activities
constitute state action.
There are two alternative approaches pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts
that do not depend on a finding of state action, but they are of limited
utility. The first approach makes use of the fact that private activity in
conjunction or conspiracy with official government activity gives rise to a
cause of action. 24  The nuclear industry often undertakes its intelligence
activities with at least the cooperation of government officials. 2 However,
a finding of conspiracy with government officials requires substantially
more government participation than this.2 6
Second, the conspiracy provisions of the Civil Rights Acts2 7 reach some
exclusively private activities.28 However, the likelihood of making private
conspiracies actionable has been diminished by a requirement of "class
based animus," which has been interpreted by some courts to include only a
racial motivation, 9 and by a requirement of a constitutional violation,
which covers only a very limited range of intelligence activities.3 0  The
22. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); S. Rep. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess, (1964),
cf, Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
23. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n. v. Veraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Worth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Hall v. Beals, 346 U.S. 45 (1969).
24. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Butz, supra note 3, at 44-45; Marwick, supra note 3, at 6; PETERZELL,
supra note 3, at 25-65, WARNOCK, supra note 3, at 78-107.
26. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 348 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) the Court stated that the
petitioner would show an abridgement of her fourteenth amendment right if she demon-
strated that the state had compelled the allegedly unconstitutional act. See also J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 460-64 (1978).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
28. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co.,
507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc);
Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Puentes v. Sullivan, 425 F. Supp. 249
(W.D. Tex. 1977). See generally M. AVERY & D. RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT LAW AND
LrrIGATION § 2.3(l)(2) (1980); Note, The Scope of Section 1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breck-
enridge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1977); Note, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1721 (1977).
29. See Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976); Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
30. Some courts have suggested that violations of federal statutory rights may also be
included. See M. AVERY & D. RUDOVSKY, supra note 28, § 2.3(l)(2).
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constitutional limits on intelligence activities have been summarized as fol-
lows:
[S]urveillance of public political activity by non-intrusive means
and the cataloguing of the information obtained may not state a
cause of action... [except] where the police use illegal surveillance
or disruption techniques, e.g., wiretapping without court order,
theft of documents, acts of provocation by agents .... [Also,] the
police cannot disseminate the information obtained by surveillance
beyond other government officials with a need to know, particu-
larly where such dissemination is for the purpose of deterring or
preventing one's exercise of constitutional rights.3 '
There are no constitutional limits, for example, on the infiltration of




There exist tort and criminal remedies for some forms of surveillance
and harassment, including those generally perceived as the most offensive:
physical attacks,3 3 wiretapping3 4 and "character assassination." - In addi-
tion, the more generalized tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress 36 offers a possible avenue of relief in some instances. Generally, the
defenses available in tort actions based on these theories are limited to a
narrow conception of defense of oneself or others.37  Unless the danger
embodied in nuclear power leads courts and juries to expand the scope of
31. Id. § 2.3(0 (citations omitted). See also Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen.,
419 U.S. 1314 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Philadelphia Yearly Meeting v.
Tate, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Fifth
Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1973); Berlin Democratic Club
v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407
F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Handschu v. Special Serv. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
32. See, e.g., DONNER, supra note 2; Marwick, supra note 3, at 6. See also PETErZELL,
supra note 3 at 25-89; WNARNOCK, supra note 3, at 55-107.
33. All jurisdictions permit common-law or statutory claims for assault and/or battery.
See RESTATmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEuMENT].
34. Most states have adopted statutes rendering private-party wiretapping criminal,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West Supp. 1981); many have incorporated wiretapping into
the common-law tort of invasion of privacy. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
Pennsylvania's statute makes it a felony to "willfully intercept .... any wire or oral
message." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703(1). See also Hamberger v. Eastment, 106 N.H.
107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 114 Ohio App. 2d 299, 182 N.E. 2d
15 (Ct. App. 1961).
35. "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability ... if the matter publicized ... (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." RASTATEmENT, spra
note 33, § 652D.
36. See id. § 46.
37. Id. §§ 63-76.
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these defenses, 38 these remedies appear adequate for the activities they
cover.
For a broad range of other intelligence activities, however, there are no
remedies. Among the practices deemed acceptable are systematic interviews
of friends, relations and acquaintances; 39 development of extensive files on
individuals, which include information on membership in organizations;
attendance at meetings and contacts with other individuals; 40 following and
photographing individuals, as long as they are in a public place; 4 and some
forms of surveillance of subjects around their homes. 42 There are no limits
on the infiltration of groups.
Along with the absence of remedies for such intelligence and surveil-
lance activities there may exist another problem-a tendency for judges to
focus on isolated incidents rather than courses of conduct. At least one
court, when faced with a pattern of surveillance activities involving a range
of practices over a period of time, chose to dissect the overall pattern of
behavior and examine each activity separately and in isolation. 43 Such an
attitude, in combination with the problem of inadequate remedies, creates a
dangerous blind spot, an area in which private surveillance seems to operate
unchecked, allowing wrongs to go unredressed.
There are several common-law torts which in the future may apply to
these activities to provide control and recovery. This section will examine
the problems, limitations and potential use of the following torts: conver-
sion, trespass to personal property or chattels, tresspass to property, inva-
sion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
1. Conversion
Theft of documents, photographs, membership lists or other property
is actionable as conversion. 44 The remedy, however, is limited to the value
38. In some areas of tort law, particular instances of otherwise actionable conduct have
been excused because of a substantial state interest in the continued performance of the
conduct. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
39. See Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc.2d 301, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 514 (Sup. Ct.
1968), aff'd 31 A.D.2d 392, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1969), aff'd 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765,
307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
40. The Supreme Court has found that similar conduct by federal agencies creates no
injury and therefore does not come within the jurisdiction of the courts. Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1971).
41. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc.2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d 514.
42. Some extremely intrusive means of home surveillance would be criminal under
Peeping Tom statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(h) (West Supp. 1981). However,
monitoring entry and exit of visitors and observing outdoor activities will generally be
approved. Alabama Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 225 So.2d 848 (1969);
Souder v. Pendleton Detective Agency, 88 So.2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
43. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 265, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1970).
44. "Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion over a chattel which so seriously
interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay
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of the property converted.4 5  Since documents, membership lists and even
photographs are of little value except to the original owner, recovery is
likely to be trivial.4 6 Conversion does not necessitate return of the items,
assuming their continued existence, as long as the plaintiff is compensated. 47
Thus, both as a restorative remedy and as a deterrent, the traditional notion
of conversion is of limited use. Recognition of the unusual "value" and the
potential for abuse embodied in a membership list might, in the future,
make this a more effective remedy, but no court to date has taken this step.
2. Trespass to Personal Property or Chattels
Trespass to personal property traditionally is distinguished from con-
version in that the former encompasses cases involving less than "serious"
dispossession, while the latter is restricted to more extreme cases. 48 Again,
the cause of action's critical weakness lies in its remedy, which is formulated
by reference to the value of the property.49  Moreover, the tort of trespass
to personal property leaves untouched a significant intelligence activity: the
copying of documents, by photocopying or photography, which in effect
"steals" the content, yet is neither conversion nor trespass because it results
in no "damage" to the document. 0
3. Trespass
Physical entry onto private property would constitute a trespass and
entitle the victim to damages, 5' but the amount of damages is likely to be
insignificant. If the trespasser causes no harm, only nominal damages will
usually be awarded . 2  If the trespasser causes some harm to land, the
damages are limited to: "(a) the difference between the value of the land
before the harm and the value after the harm... (b) the loss of use of the
land, and (c) discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant." 53 In either
case, the damages are unlikely to amount to much.
the other full value of the chattel." RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 222A. See also Socialist
Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 463 F. Supp. 515 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
45. RESTATEmENT, supra note 33 § 222A, comment c.
46. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The authorities do recognize
that certain papers have special value: "If the document is of peculiar historic, literary, or
artistic value, such value may be obtained under ordinary rules of the law of damages."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 242 comment a. But the cause of action is unlikely to avail
someone dispossessed of a business document such as a membership list.
47. RESTATErmNT, supra note 33, § 222A, comment c.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. RESTATEimNT, supra note 33, § 218(b). In order to gain access to documents, the
defendant may commit other torts-particularly trespass to land. See infra notes 51-52, and
accompanying text.
51. RESTATEmENT, supra note 33, § 158.
52. RESTATEmENT, supra note 33, § 163, comment e. However, punitive damages may be
imposed on a trespasser who knows "that his entry is without the consent of the possessor
and without any other privilege." Id.
53. RESTATEhMENT, supra note 33, § 162.
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4. Invasion of Privacy
In most jurisdictions, invasion of privacy includes four distinct torts.5 4
For the purposes of this paper the most relevant is intentional intrusion
upon the seclusion, solitude or private affairs and concerns of another. Such
an intrusion is generally actionable only if "highly offensive to a reasonable
person." s55 This has been held to include wiretapping, mail opening, and
the use of parabolic microphones or binoculars to spy on the home. 5
However, spying on public activities through techniques like photo-
graphing demonstrators at a public meeting, observing visitors at a subject's
home or following individuals on the street is not generally actionable under
this tort.57 The distinction between actionable and nonactionable conduct
rests on the notion that participants in public activities have a diminished
expectation of privacy concerning those activities. 58 Since a "reasonable"
person would not expect such activities to enjoy a cloak of privacy, she
would suffer no "highly offensive intrusion" as a result of surveillance.
Even in cases where surveillance of public or private activities does cause an
offensive intrusion, another obstacle may block a successful invasion of
privacy claim: some courts have shown a willingness to allow defendants to
avoid liability on the ground that a reasonable purpose or social utility
justified their actions.
For example, in Forster v. Manchester,5 9 the plaintiff sued for injunc-
tive and monetary relief on theories of invasion of privacy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. It was conceded that the defendant, a
licensed private investigator, had assigned two men equipped with movie
cameras to report on the plaintiff's activities. The surveillance teams fol-
lowed the plaintiff's car, keeping a log of all stops and filming her activi-
ties. 0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's claim, noting
two factors. First, because all the surveillance occurred in public places,
where the plaintiff could be observed by passersby, she was entitled to only
54. They are (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, (2) appropriation
of another's name or likeness, (3) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life, and
(4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, §
652A; see also N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1981).
55. Id., § 652B.
56. See Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965) (wiretapping);
Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (wiretapping); Birnbaum v.
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd 588 F.2d (2d Cir. 1978) (mail
opening); Souder v. Pendelton Detective Agency, 88 So.2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956) (general
surveillance using binoculars).
57. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
58. See Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963). This notion also
pervades fourth amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351-52 (1967).
59. 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963).
60. Id. at 193-94, 189 A.2d at 148.
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a limited expectation of privacy. 6' Second, the surveillance of the plaintiff
was arranged by the defendant in connection with a separate lawsuit
brought by the plaintiff. The defendant hoped to use the surveillance to
determine the merits of the plaintiff's injury claims. The court, noting the
circumstances that led to the surveillance, stated: "[W]e feel that there is
much social utility to be gained from these investigations. It is in the best
interests of society that valid claims be ascertained and fabricated claims be
exposed." 62 The court concluded that the defendant could, in this in-
stance, successfully invoke "the defense of social utility.,"
6 3
This defense of social utility could present a major stumbling block to
successful claims of invasion of privacy in the context of nuclear industry
surveillance. However, cases of the Forster v. Manchester type may repre-
sent a narrow and exceptional use of the defense of social utility. In such
cases, the defense is available only because the plaintiff has placed his own
activities or physical condition directly at issue by bringing suit. A similar
rationale is reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide
that a party may be required to submit to a medical examination when his or
her mental or physical condition is at issue. 64 The penalty for not submit-
ting to this invasion of privacy is forfeiture of the claim.05 Under this
rationale the social utility defense would be allowed only when the defend-
ant undertakes the surveillance to collect evidence pertinent to an issue
created by the plaintiff's suit. Thus the social utility defense would not be
applicable to nuclear industry surveillance of anti-nuclear activists whose
only litigation arises from the privacy claim.
Two arguments, however, may be advanced against this proposition.
First, by publicly opposing nuclear power, an individual arguably places
herself in the public eye in a manner analogous to the plaintiff in a civil suit.
This limited public figure status may justify diminution of the individual's
right to privacy, especially regarding the individual's motivation for the
public anti-nuclear stand or acts.
Second, it could be argued that the limits of the rationale should be
ignored because the danger allegedly posed by nuclear terrorism or sabotage
is so grave. The defense of social utility could be expanded, in other words,
because of security-perhaps even national security-concerns. Indeed, the
danger posed by a handful of fraudulent claims may be said to pale beside
that of unauthorized individuals gaining control of large amounts of fission-
able materials. Extension of the "social utility" defense along these lines
could eliminate invasion of privacy suits as an effective response to nuclear
industry surveillance.
61. Id. at 197, 189 A.2d at 150.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 198, 189 A.2d at 151.
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.
65. Id.
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5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
This tort could reach a wide range of surveillance activities, including
all of those discussed above . 6 However, one element of the tort is intent to
cause emotional distress. 67 Ironically, a stated purpose to obtain informa-
tion could preclude the required showing of intent.68 In addition, the
surreptitious nature of most surveillance activities would circumstantially
rebut an allegation of intent to harass.
In Nader v. General Motors Corp.,69 a majority of the New York Court
of Appeals suggested that infliction of emotional distress was the proper
cause of action for Mr. Nader's surveillance claim. 70 The concurring opin-
ion, noting the particular proof requirements for that tort and the potential
for the defense of alternative purposes, disagreed. Three judges concluded
that it would prove nearly impossible for Nader to prevail on that theory .7
6. The Difficulties of State Tort Law Remedies: Two Examples
Ralph Nader's suit against General Motors72 (GM) exemplifies the
difficulties of the various state tort law remedies. Nader alleged that GM
had tapped his phone, shadowed him, made harassing phone calls, inter-
viewed friends to obtain personal information, and attempted to sexually
entice and compromise him through several young women. 73 The New
York Court of Appeals, ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss, held that
gathering information does not constitute invasion of privacy under the law
of the District of Columbia74 unless the information is completely confiden-
tial (not including anything known to others) and the defendant is unreason-
ably intrusive.75  The interviews of friends, harassing phone calls and at-
tempts at sexual enticement were seen as aimed at gathering nonconfidential
information.76  The shadowing was allowable if the information would be
available to a casual observer.7 7  Only the wiretapping was clearly action-
able.78 In a concurring opinion, Justice Breitel, joined by two other jus-
66. RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, at § 46.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 572, 255 N.E.2d 765,
772, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 656 (1970) (Breitel, J., concurring in result).
69. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
70. Id. at 569-70, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654-55.
71. Id. at 572, 255 N.E.2d at 772, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
72. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1970).
73. Id. at 564, 255 N.E.2d at 767, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
74. The parties stipulated to application of the substantive law of the District of
Columbia, the place where most of the acts allegedly occured, and where plaintiff lived and
suffered the effects of the acts. Id. at 565, 255 N.E.2d at 767-68, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
75. Id. at 567, 255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
76. Id. at 568-9, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
77. Id. at 570, 255 N.E.2d at 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
78. Id.
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tices, took a somewhat broader view of actionable conduct and suggested
that the activities be viewed together rather than separately. 7 But the
majority decision rendered the state tort route essentially meaningless.
Another recent case, Long Island Lighting Co. v. SHAD,8 also high-
lights the problems of applying state tort law remedies to nuclear industry
surveillance. Here, an antinuclear group raised several state and federal law
claims in a counterclaim challenging a nuclear utility's intelligence activities.
The Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) and several unions involved in
the construction of its Shoreham Nuclear Generating Station had brought
an action in the New York Supreme Court asking for over S2 million in
damages and an injunction against attempts by the SHAD Alliance and
other antinuclear groups to stop construction of the plant. The defendants
raised first amendment, necessity, and other defenses and filed a counter-
claim alleging that LILCO had infiltrated the SHAD Alliance, stolen some
of its documents and engaged in a course of intelligence and other activities
intended to create fear among persons opposed to nuclear power and to
undermine support for the SHAD Alliance. The counterclaim was based on
the federal Civil Rights Acts and several state torts, including invasion of
privacy, harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
After a brief removal to federal court, where a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim was largely denied,8' the state court dismissed it entirely and
denied leave to replead.82 While the dismissal was based in part on the
inadequacy of the pleadings, the court substantively rejected the federal
claims for lack of state action, without even discussing the private conspir-
acy claim.8 3 The state tort claims were dismissed largely without explana-
tion.8 An additional claim that LILCO had interfered with SHAD's "eco-
nomic relationships" with third parties was also rejected, because SHAD is
not "a profit-making organization" and is "nothing more than a group of
people who are opposing nuclear power." "-
C. Administrative Remedies
Since most nuclear power utilities are state regulated, it is possible to
obtain limited relief against them in administrative proceedings. Most utility
79. Id. at 571-3, 255 N.E.2d at 772, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57.
80. No. 80-17790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 1981) (granting motion for dismissal of
counterclaims).
81. Long Island Lighting Co. v. SHAD, No. 80-2647 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1981).
Plaintiff's initial motion to remand to the state court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), was
denied, but the court granted a later remand motion on March 13, 1981. Id.
82. Long Island Lighting Co. v. SHAD No. 80-17790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 1981)
(granting motion for dismissal of counterclaims).
83. Id.
84. On the invasion of privacy issue, the court said, "defendants failed to show any
right as to their privacy which has been violated." Id. On the infliction of emotional distress
issue, the court dismissed the counterclaim without further explanation, "on the authority of
Fischer v. Maloney."
85. Id.
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regulatory agencies are authorized to exclude from customer rates expendi-
tures that are inconsistent with the customers' or the public's interest.80
This possibility is being pursued in a case now pending before the Pennsyl-
vania Public Utilities Commission, where the Keystone Alliance, the Ameri-
can Friends Service Committee, the Consumer Education and Protective
Association, and a variety of anti-nuclear groups and individuals are chal-
lenging intelligence activities of the Philadelphia Electric Company (PE).a7
These groups filed their complaint following PE's release of photographs of
anti-nuclear demonstrators to the local news media in an attempt to under-
cut the activists' effectiveness. 8 While a successful result in this case would
financially limit the utility, save the customers' money and bring the surveil-
lance issue to the public's attention, no injunctive or monetary relief for the
victims is likely to be available.8 9
The law simply has not come to grips with private intelligence activities
that are already widespread throughout our society. Existing remedies do
not discourage abusive conduct, and no new remedies appear on the hori-
zon. No standards or concern for specifically political private surveillance
have been incorporated into the law or even seriously discussed. Some
observers might blame this vacuum on the law's tardiness in responding to
social developments, pointing out that the remedies currently available de-
veloped in response to other transgressions in other times and, sometimes,
other places. However, the lack of adequate legal remedies for private
intelligence activities arises from far deeper social and legal problems.
II.
THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEM
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its predecessor, the Atomic
Energy Commission, have sponsored three studies that seriously discuss
detention of dissidents without charges or probable cause, indiscriminate
general searches, widespread wiretapping, infiltration of groups and even
torture. The Barton Report, 90 which evidences considerable sensitivity to the
civil liberties issues, envisioned the following scenarios:
86. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 113 (Consol. Supp. 1982).
87. Keystone Alliance, et al. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. C-78080459 (Pa. P.U.C.
Aug. 3, 1979) (denying motion to dismiss). The complainants also seek exclusion of any
activity that promotes nuclear power. David Kairys serves as counsel for complainants in this
case.
88. The same activitiy undertaken by the local police or by an institution or agency
considered an arm of the state could be unconstitutional. See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting v.
Tate, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975).
89. In Keystone Alliance, complainants' request that the utility be ordered to cease its
intelligence activities was dismissed as falling outside the jurisdiction of the Commission.
90. J. BARTON, INTENSIFIED NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1975).
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[D]issidents might be seized and detained after a plutonium theft.
Detention might be justified as a way to isolate and immobilize
persons capable of fashioning the material into an explosive device
.... [D]etention could also be used as a step in a very troubling
interrogation scheme-perhaps employing lie detectors or even tor-
ture.91
The Mitre Report 92-which utilized consultants like William Sullivan and
Charles Brennan, who ran the FBI's COINTELPRO spying and disruption
program-and the Rosenbaum Report9 3 foresaw widespread surveillance
and intelligence activities by nuclear corporations and the government,
including infiltration of groups and exchanges of intelligence information
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission acting as a clearinghouse. 4
These forecasts should be understood in the context of the proliferation of
private intelligence agencies and activities that accompanied the relative
decline, under considerable public pressure, of governmental intelligence
activities beginning in the mid-1970's.9 5
Provision of effective legal remedies for such activities raises two basic
problems of the law and of society generally. First, traditional standards for
analyzing speech and associational issues, even if an appropriate vehicle can
be found for their application, will likely prove inadequate to the task with
regard to both private and governmental intelligence activities. Second,
traditional thinking about the distinction between public and private activity
prevents the development of legal remedies for private, and particularly
corporate, abuse of individual liberties.
Using the traditional approach, courts consider the possible infringe-
ments on civil liberties and balance them against a variety of other factors to
determine whether the infringements are legally permissible.9 0 Surveillance
and infiltration can be shown to involve considerable infringements of civil
liberties, and substantial arguments against allowing such infringements
may be marshalled. For example, courts could be urged to insist that utilities
protect nuclear security by insuring the physical security of nuclear facilities
and materials rather than surveilling nuclear opponents and the public.
Courts could also be encouraged to question the tendency to view opponents
of nuclear power as dangerous. People oppose nuclear power mainly be-
91. Id. at 27.
92. MrrRE CoRP., Ti THREAT TO LICENSED NucLEAR FAcILIIs (1975).
93. D. RoSENBAUM, A SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS STUDY: REPORT TO THE ATOMIC ENEGY
CommssIoN (1974).
94. These reports, particularly the Barton report, also discuss civil liberties issues con-
cerning employees in the nuclear industry.
95. See DONNER, supra note 2, at 414.
96. See generally, L. TRmE, AhmucA, CoNsTrrTiToNAL LAw, 581-84, 674, 682-88, 722-
24, 748, 847-48 (1978).
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cause they are concerned about inadequate safety precautions, the danger of
nuclear catastrophe and the effects on the environment and the economy.
This hardly seems like an appropriate segment of the population to target
for investigation if one is looking for terrorists or thieves.17
Despite these arguments against infringement of civil liberties, the tra-
ditional balancing approach involves the possibility that each infringement,
viewed in isolation, will seem minimal compared to the danger of nuclear
theft or terrorism. The balancing test is quite vague and open to subjective
considerations; it provides only "various considerations [that can] be enu-
merated but not weighed. There [is] no standard of reference upon which to
base a reasoned, functional determination. Ultimately, the decision rest[s]
upon vague judgments, most of them unexpressed." 9 8 Even without the
nuclear power factor or the problems of trying to reach private activities,
the balancing test as applied to the government has failed to yield, for
example, any limits on the infiltration of groups. 9 In the nuclear context,
the specter of the overwhelming consequences of a nuclear incident could
convince even the most libertarian judge or legislator of the appropriateness
of a particular restraint on civil liberties.
This may well occur despite the low probability that theft or terrorism
would result in a nuclear explosion or a release of radiation, and the even
lower probability that surveillance of nuclear power opponents would pro-
vide any real protection. In our history, intelligence activities have been used
to support established policies and to suppress opponents, not to protect us
from danger. Many past intelligence abuses have been planned and mali-
cious, while other seem to result from an apparently inevitable intelligence
mentality. But all intelligence activities related to public issues have consist-
ently resulted in abuses and served a primarily or solely political-as op-
posed to law enforcement or security-function. °00 It would be naive and
dangerous to ignore this lesson or to take security and law enforcement
claims at face value, particularly when dealing with an industry and govern-
ment that failed to evacuate people around Three Mile Island 101 and consist-
ently withheld vital information during that crisis because of the possible
impact on public opinion.10 2
97. There is an unsettling irony to the logic of intelligence: opponents of nuclear power
are moved to speak out in large part because of the danger of nuclear power, yet they are
closely watched, their rights are infringed and public debate is stifled, supposedly because of
that same danger.
98. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 117 (1970). See generally
Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLmCS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed., forthcoming).
99. See supra text accompanying note 31.
100. See generally, DONNER, supra note 2; BLACKSTOCK, supra note 5.
101. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR
CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF THREE MILE ISLAND 38-41 (1979).
102. Id. at 18, 57-58.
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Nevertheless, the validity of such claims may well be accepted. Thus,
application of the traditional balancing approach could result in a piece-by-
piece erosion of fundamental rights, and perhaps a change of attitude about
basic civil liberties and democratic processes that could extend beyond
nuclear issues. The revision of legal principles which would accompany such
a change could include revival of the "bad tendency" and "constructive
intent" doctrines, which formed a major component of speech law before
the 1930's.103
Just as the traditional balancing approach will not avail the victims of
government and private surveillance, traditional thinking about the distinc-
tion between public and private activity prevents provision of adequate legal
remedies to victims of private intelligence activities. While there has been a
revolution in the sophistication and availability of private intelligence serv-
ices, 10 4 the legal system and society itself have yet to recognize any signifi-
cant limits on private activities that subvert civil liberties. This vacuum is
based on the ideological separation of our lives into public and private
spheres, which is quite evident in Metropolitan Edison.105  In the public
sphere, which includes activities like expression of political beliefs and
selection of government officials, basic concepts of freedom, democracy
and equality apply. However, in the private sphere, which includes almost
all economic activity and other major decisions that shape our society and
affect our lives, we insure no democracy or equality, only the freedom to
buy and sell. Fundamental social issues, such as the use of resources,
investment, the energy problem and the distribution of goods and services,
are all left to private-mainly corporate-decision makers.
Maintenance of this separation in contemporary society may well ren-
der the notion of civil liberties meaningless; and in this sense, intelligence
activities of the nuclear industry constitute just one aspect of the broader
problem of establishing limits on corporate activities, akin to more familiar
issues like toxic wastes, workplace safety and runaway shops. While the
present administration and political mood tend to identify unrestricted cor-
porate power with the public interest and basic democratic principles, their
fundamental incompatability will emerge with painful clarity as the "un-
leashing" of the corporation proves economically, environmentally, and
socially disastrous. What will be needed, if the law is to play a progressive
role, is a leap similar to the recognition many decades ago that the concept
103. The "bad tendency" doctrine regarded as constitutionally unprotected any expres-
sion of words that might, in however remote or indirect a fashion, contribute to some future
harm. The "constructive intent" doctrine ascribed to the spearker or writer the intent to
cause such remote consequences. See Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
(1941); L. WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF CIVIL LmERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1927); Rabban,
The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981); Kairys, supra note 98.
104. See-supra note 2.
105. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
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of civil liberty is meaningless unless it restricts the states as well as the
federal government. 10 6
III
CONCLUSION
Corporate and government agencies have engaged in a wide variety of
intelligence activities aimed at opponents of nuclear power. Because tradi-
tional legal thinking distinguishes between the public sphere, in which con-
stitutional limitations apply, and the private sphere, in which no significant
constitutional or other limitations apply, intelligence activities carried out
by private individuals or organizations remain largely unchecked by the law.
Governmental intelligence activities in theory are subject to constitutional
limitations; in practice, victims of such activities have no adequate legal
remedy. Application of the traditional balancing approach used to assess the
legality of conduct infringing civil liberties may very well result in a finding
that the overwhelming need for nuclear security outweighs and justifies the
infringement. If this justification gains judicial or societal acceptance, be-
cause of real, imagined or manipulated perceptions, we may face a funda-
mental choice between nuclear power and civil liberties. Instead of accepting
nuclear power as a given, and attempting, perhaps vainly, to minimize its
effect on civil liberties, we should recognize that it is nuclear power, not
liberty, that poses the danger, and we should decide as a society which is
more important.
106. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-69 (1978).
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